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503 
CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR LABOR SAFETY 
VIOLATIONS IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA 
I. INTRODUCTION  
China’s workers have fallen on hard times.1 In the Peoples Republic of 
China’s (PRC’s) new socialist market economy State-owned enterprises, 
which currently employ about sixty percent of the urban population, have 
been forced to lay off workers to compete with the emerging private sector 
and international conglomerates.2 China scholars have recently devoted 
much attention to the sad state of Chinese workers, telling tales of 
inefficient social insurance and rampant unemployment.3 Some scholars 
have found it almost impossible to count the numbers of urban 
unemployed in the world’s most populous nation.4 Moreover, to add injury 
to insult, there are problems inside the factory as well. The Chinese 
government has come under considerable pressure to deal with the 
growing number of industrial accidents, resulting deaths, and uncountable 
labor law violations that plague a nation vigorously trying to conform its 
laws to WTO standards within the next several years.5 Indeed, there is a 
 
 
 1. See generally Marc J. Blecher, Hegemony and Workers’ Politics, 170 CHINA Q. 283 (2002). 
One author comments:  
To be sure, rising social frustration results partly from the hardships produced by China’s 
economic transition. In recent years, falling income in rural areas and rapidly growing 
unemployment in the cities have contributed to the rising discontent among tens of millions 
of peasants and workers.  
Min Xin Pei, China’s Governance Crisis, 81 J. FOREIGN AFFAIRS 97, 107 (2002). The Chinese 
government faces a clash between east and west as well. Id. at 107. Eastern China has grown 
prosperous under the reforms while conditions in western China have stayed the same or, in some 
cases even deteriorated. Id. at 109. The rising unhappiness amongst rural workers in western China has 
also caused considerable strife in some of the remote areas and has caught the attention of the 
authorities in Beijing. See generally THOMAS BERNSTEIN & LU XIAOBO, TAXATION WITHOUT 
REPRESENTATION (2003).  
 2. See generally JUSTIN YIFU LIN ET AL., STATE OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORM IN CHINA 1-10 
(2001).  
 3. See generally Blecher, supra note 1, at 283-85. Unemployment rates have been particularly 
bad in urban areas and steadily growing since the mid-1990s. Id. Figures show that there has been an 
increase in urban unemployment every year since 1993. UNITED NATIONS, CHINA HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 43-47 (1999). One scholar notes that statistics on employment are inconsistent 
and that there may indeed be no way for China to count its numbers of unemployed. Dorothy Solinger, 
China’s Uncountable Unemployed, 168 CHINA Q. 1-30 (2001).  
 4. Blecher, supra note 1, at 283. 
 5. Industrial Accidents Plague China, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2002, at A9. “This year, more than 
3,400 people have died in China’s mines, where ventilators and other basic safety equipment are often 
nonexistent and explosions and flooding are common. Last year’s official death toll was 5,670, though 
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growing realization that China faces a massive challenge in bringing its 
labor standards up to code for the WTO, especially while trying to make 
an already failing State sector internationally competitive.6 
Over the past twenty years, China has enacted a number of labor laws 
and regulations aimed at dealing with labor safety problems.7 Most 
importantly, the PRC enacted a labor law in 1994,8 and since then, the 
provinces and other assorted jurisdictions have done a considerable 
amount of legislating at the local level on labor standards and safety.9 At 
that time, scholars were optimistic that this profuse labor legislation would 
work to fix some of the labor issues that have been piling up since the 
beginning of the reform era in 1978.10 Unfortunately, China’s workers are 
not much safer and happier than they were before.11 This continuing 
problem leads one to question how effective the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Security (MOLSS) and the Chinese courts have been at enforcing 
this growing body of labor and employment law. Also relevant to this 
discussion, is the question of how many of the labor safety violations in 
highly industrialized areas are actually uncovered in time to prevent 
accidents and save lives. The answer, unfortunately, is very few.12 It seems 
then that China’s labor law provides for an ineffective system for 
supervising and deterring production operations from engaging in illegal 
and unsafe labor practices.  
In light of the serious deficiencies in the current civil and 
administrative legal mechanisms available for the enforcement of labor 
safety violations,13 this Note will argue that the PRC should strengthen 
existing criminal penalties and deterrents for violating labor safety laws. 
More specifically, the Chinese Government must consider refining and 
 
 
many suggest the actual numbers could be even higher.” Id.  
 6. See LIN, supra note 2, at 15-25.  
 7. See HILLARY K. JOSEPHS, LABOR LAW IN CHINA: CHOICE AND RESPONSIBILITY (1991).  
 8. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong fa [The Labor Law of the People’s Republic of China] 
[hereinafter PRC Labor Law], in XINBIAN ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO CHANGYONG FALU 
FAGUI QUANSHU (2002), at 2047 [hereinafter XINBIAN].  
 9. JOSEPHS, supra note 7, at 50-90.  
 10. See generally supra note 7.  
 11. The Congressional Executive Commission on China recently published a report on the state 
of labor in the PRC since the promulgation of the PRC Labor Law. CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE 
COMMISSION ON CHINA, ANNUAL REPORT 84-110 (2002), available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/ 
annualRpt/annRptCombo2.php [hereinafter 2002 CECC Report]. The Report stated that in 2001 alone 
over 60,000 people were killed in safety accidents in China. Id.  
 12. See infra Part I.A and accompanying notes.  
 13. Indeed, one official in the Chinese government stated that managers have turned “a deaf ear 
to safety regulations and management process.” Industrial Accidents Plague China, supra note 5, at 
A10. 
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more frequently utilizing some of the provisions in the Labor Law and the 
Criminal Code to bring about a more effective system of criminal 
enforcement of the labor law, establish more formidable deterrents for 
managers and workers in enterprises in both the public and private sector, 
and promote a safe workplace.14 This Note will argue that this kind of 
reform should include more defined mens rea requirements,15 criminal 
liability for managers in the enterprise or legal entity, and criminal 
liability for safety violations which create a serious risk, but have not yet 
caused a serious accident.16  
A. The History of Labor Law in the PRC 
Until the enactment of the 1994 Labor Law, the PRC had no 
comprehensive labor law other than a set of regulations,17 which were 
 
 
 14. The Criminal Code of the PRC already includes a provision for which workers can be held 
liable for causing a serious accident, but the provision should, as this Note will argue, be reformed in 
order to improve enforcement. The provisions specifically relevant to these circumstances exist under 
Articles 134 and 135 of the criminal code under the heading of The Crime of Damaging the Public’s 
Safety. Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo xingfa [The Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China], 
in XINBIAN, at 2085 [hereinafter “PRC Criminal Law”]. This Note will also examine the theory of 
negligent homicide which also has a place in the PRC Criminal Law under the heading of Crimes 
Infringing on the Rights and Safety of the Individual. PRC Criminal Law, art. 233. 
 15. The PRC Criminal Code includes mens rea requirements. Compare Articles 14 and 15 of the 
Criminal Code with the offenses mentioned in Article 134 and 135 regarding crimes to the public 
safety. PRC Criminal Law, arts. 14-15, 134-37. There is no mention made of the mens rea required for 
these crimes. Id. arts. 134-37. One would assume that such crimes could be either intentional under 
Article 14 of the criminal law or negligent under Article 15 of the criminal law. Id.  
 16. Regarding the scope of this Note, it does not deal with violations of the labor code beyond 
those which relate to the personal safety of the workers while on the job. There are, admittedly, many 
other areas such as work-time, over-time, child labor, and medical benefits which need further 
examination, but this discussion is focused exclusively on labor safety violations. In addition, the 
special protections which exist under labor law for both women and minors are not discussed here, 
even though the presence of a child or a pregnant woman in a factory dealing with dangerous materials 
might be considered a safety violation. For provisions on women and children in Chinese labor law, 
see generally GONGREN LUSHI [LABOR LAWYER] (1999); see also LAODONG HE SHEHUI BAOZHANG 
[LABOR AND SOCIAL SECURITY] 171-83 (1999).  
 17. The development of law in the PRC has caused a proliferation of regulations and other 
administrative decrees. See, e.g., XINBIAN, supra note 8, at 1-12. Some have even suggested that such 
regulations are the real meat of the law because the law enacted by the National People’s Congress and 
its Standing Committee tends to be more of a general guiding plan than a concrete set of rules and 
regulations. MURRAY SCOT TANNER, THE POLITICS OF LAWMAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA: 
INSTITUTIONS, PROCESSES AND DEMOCRATIC PROSPECTS 129-30 (1999) [hereinafter LAWMAKING IN 
CHINA]. For a review of the development of administrative regulations in Chinese law, see Perry 
Keller, Sources of Order in Chinese Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 711, 723. Since the publication of Mr. 
Keller’s article, the Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China has given scholars an even 
better idea of how Chinese legislation works. See Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo lifa fa [Legislation 
Law of the People’s Republic of China], in XINBIAN, at 198 (1994) [hereinafter PRC Legislation 
Law]. The Legislation Law codified the practice of first enacting a set of administrative regulations 
and once practice had dictated how such measures worked out, the NPC would enact an actual law on 
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drafted by the then Ministry of Labor within the State Council.18 In fact, 
the growth of the concept of labor rights as codified in the 1994 law19 has 
been a long time in the making, although the celebration of the worker in 
Chinese society was important throughout the earlier part of the 
communist era.20 Indeed, the establishment of the Chinese Communist 
Party in the early 1920s century brought a worker’s movement to life that 
prevailed throughout the Mao Era.21 This movement gathered momentum 
during the Cultural Revolution (1965-1969) when the workers were one of 
the groups, which were active in many of the new movements (yundong) 
that tore through Chinese society.22  
Then, with the death of Mao Ze Dong in the late 1970s and the 
beginning of the reform era under Deng Xiao Ping, the place of workers in 
the PRC began to fall.23 Deng’s market reforms brought about a new 
 
 
the subject. PRC Legislation Law, arts. 9-11. Indeed, it appears this is what happened with regard to 
China’s Labor Law, because there was a large amount of administrative regulation before there was a 
labor code. JOSEPHS, supra note 7.  
 18. The State Council is what one might think of as the executive department of the Chinese 
Government. WANG CHENGUANG & ZHANG XIANCHU, AN INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE LAW 20-35 
(1997). The State Council may delegate power to the departments to draft regulations. LAWMAKING IN 
CHINA, supra note 17, at 129. The more specific contours of this arrangement may be found in Chapter 
Three of the Legislation Law. PRC Legislation Law, ch. 3.  
 19. PRC Labor Law, ch. 1.  
 20. Traditionally workers were in the middle of a social hierarchy of the common people (Ping 
min) which was farmers (nong), laborers (gong) and then merchants (shang). GUO JIAN ET AL., 
ZHONGGUO FALU SHI [CHINESE LEGAL HISTORY] 148-51 (2000). Since the beginning of the 
communist party in 1922 a more cohesive workers movement began to develop. Li Fang Zhi, Xin 
zhongguo chengli qian de laodong fa [Labor Law Before the Establishment of the New China], in 
LAODONG FA LUNWEN JI [A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS ON LABOR LAW] 226 (1984) [hereinafter LABOR 
ESSAYS]. One author comments: “In ancient China . . . the safety and health of worker was not 
protected at all . . . . After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China . . . laborers became the 
leaders of the nation.” Xiao Liang & Zhang Yi, Min Shilun jiaqiang woguo anquan weisheng lifa de 
yiyi [Debating the Significance of Legislation on Safety Standards] 167, 167, in LABOR ESSAYS, 
supra.  
 21. The Mao Era here refers to the time (1979-1976) during which Mao was the de jure and de 
facto ruler of the People’s Republic of China. RICHARD BAUM, BURYING MAO 1-10 (1995).  
 22. During the Cultural Revolution there was a workers’ movement, and Mao Ze Dong and his 
wife Jiang Qing encouraged a sort of second revolution amongst lower level workers. The leader of the 
workers movement was Wang Hongwen, who eventually became a member of the infamous Gang of 
Four (sirenbang) and was prosecuted in the early 1980s with the rest of his cohorts. For an excellent 
description of the role that the workers played during the Cultural Revolution, see generally 
ELIZABETH PERRY & LI XUN, PROLETARIAN POWER: SHANGHAI AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION 
(1994).  
 23. For an excellent analysis of the trials and tribulations of growing out of the Maoist economy 
and the effect on workers and other segments of society, see generally BARRY NAUGHTON, GROWING 
OUT OF THE PLAN (1993). For a more current analysis of the problems facing labor in the PRC, see 
Minxin Pei, supra note 1, at 105. Indeed, scholarship in the United States has been increasingly 
focused on the plight of the workers, once the most important part of the Chinese State, during the 
reform era. Id. An entire issue of CHINA QUARTERLY, a prominent Journal published by the School of 
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private sector, which created competition for the enormous, inefficient 
State enterprises, and the workers were hit from two angles. First, in the 
private sector labor was no longer protected by the State, or at least not to 
the same extent that it was under Mao’s command economy.24 Second, due 
to changing economic conditions and the growth of a market economy in 
China, the State sector began to suffer25 and to lay off workers. Also, 
workers in the State sector were no longer protected and provided for to 
the same extent that they were under Mao’s “Iron Rice Bowl” 
(datiewan).26 The gap between the rich and the poor grew fast, and the gap 
between eastern and western parts of the PRC began to appear more 
pronounced as well.27 Thus, as China’s economic situation changed, the 
workers began to find themselves jobless and subject to new challenges in 
a more competitive market environment.28  
 
 
Oriental and African Studies in London, recently devoted an entire issue to this problem. See generally 
170 CHINA Q. 1 (2002).  
 24. NAUGHTON, supra note 23, at 54-55. A more current analysis of China’s economic situation 
can be found in NICHOLAS LARDY, CHINA’S UNFINISHED ECONOMIC REVOLUTION (2001). The book 
points out the situation in China is much different from the views put forth by perhaps overly 
optimistic foreign investors and the Chinese Government. Id. at 10. Others in fact paint the situation as 
even more bleak. They argue that the Chinese State is now on the verge of collapse due to the 
problems that the reforms and the persistent unwillingness of the Communist party to institute any sort 
of real political reform. See GORDON CHANG, THE COMING COLLAPSE OF CHINA 1-10 (2001).  
 25. The situation for the State sector is drastic. Estimates for the amount of unrecoverable loans 
made by state banks to State Enterprises fall somewhere between twenty and seventy percent. Carsten 
A. Holtz, Economic Reforms and State Sector Bankruptcy in China, 166 CHINA Q. 340, 360 (2001). 
Mr. Holtz comments: “the Chinese State then has more than relinquished its claim to assets of 
governments on all tiers, the State banking system and the SOE’s. It is Bankrupt. Even if only twenty-
five percent of the SOE loans are non-performing, following the most conservative estimates, State net 
worth is zero.” Id. at 349. While estimates of this sort may be alarmist, they do explain why the State 
Enterprises have come under such pressure to lay off workers. For statistics on the amount of laborers 
laid off each year from 1993-1999, see CHINA HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 3, at 44-47.  
 26. During the Mao-era jobs were assigned to everyone and labor was allocated, sometimes, 
without concern for need. In addition to the jobs every worker was assigned housing and healthcare 
benefits. See JOSEPHS, supra note 7. For an excellent description of how the political events played out 
in such a way that market economics took over leaving the workers to face a much more desperate 
situation, see BAUM, supra note 21, at 1-10.  
 27. KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM 75-79 
(1995). Lieberthal points to a generally destructive trend in China of an increase in corruption among 
the cadres and a loss of legitimacy of the Chinese government. Id. Moreover, Lieberthal ties the loss of 
legitimacy to the fact that the Chinese Government has tied its popular legitimacy to fast economic 
growth. Because no government can guarantee constant economic growth and perpetual prosperity, the 
Chinese Government has no other means to garner support among the population other than repressive 
means. Id. If the growth stops, slows, or goes too far in one direction, then the Chinese Government 
could be facing a legitimacy crisis. However, a more balanced approach might be more appropriate 
considering that the Communist party has managed to maintain control through worse times than this 
and there exists no credible, organized threat to its power at present. See generally IS CHINA 
UNSTABLE: ASSESSING THE FACTORS (David Shambaugh ed. 2000).  
 28. See infra Part I.A notes and accompanying text.  
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B. Domestic Labor Reform  
Deng’s market reforms also brought about a great deal of legal reform. 
The 1980s saw a considerable amount of lawmaking, which has only 
increased in the 1990s.29 With this proliferation of legislation, 
governmental organs have found themselves with more of a role to play in 
the policy process.30 In terms of labor legislation, there has been 
participation from all levels. The National People’s Congress (NPC)31 
enacted the Labor Law in 1994,32 and since then, the Ministry of the Labor 
and Social Security and the local People’s Congresses have all become 
involved in supplementing the Labor Law by drafting administrative and 
procedural regulations.33 The result of all of this legislation is a seemingly 
complete system of labor law and enforcement. However, there has been 
less success in terms of how effective the national and local governments, 
and administrative agencies have been at implementing this growing body 
of law and regulations.34  
 
 
 29. Since 1979 there have been two Criminal Codes enacted, one in 1979 and a new one in 1996, 
a Criminal Procedure Code, a Civil Procedure Code, an Arbitration Law, a Trust Law, and a 
considerable amount of other specialized legislation like the Education Law, the Product Quality Law, 
and the Income Tax Law. Indeed there has been legal growth on all fronts: basic or constitutional law, 
civil and commercial law, administrative law, economic law, social law, criminal law, litigation and 
non-litigation procedural law. See, e.g., XINBIAN, supra note 8, at 1-12. For a statistical analysis of the 
increase in legislation by the National People’s Congress and the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress from the 5th Congress in 1979 through the 8th Congress into 1999, see CHINA 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 3, at 45. The number of laws promulgated per year by the 
NPC has more than doubled and the number of resolutions passed by the NPC has increased tenfold. 
Id. at 45.  
 30. Several sources have noted the rise in prominence of the people’s congresses at the national 
and local levels. Before the reform era these bodies were a mere rubber stamp, secondary to the 
Chinese Communist Party, but the reforms and the increase in legislation have created an environment 
where national and local legislative organs can play much more of a role in the research and drafting 
of legislation. See Young Nam Cho, From “Rubber Stamps” to “Iron Stamps” The Emergence of 
Local People’s Congresses as Supervisory Power Houses, 171 CHINA Q. 725, 725-40 (2001). See also 
UNITED NATIONS, CHINA HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT: MAKING GREEN DEVELOPMENT A CHOICE 
15 (2002) (noting the importance of the National People’s Congress in drafting environmental 
legislation).  
 31. ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHE GUO XIANFA [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA], arts. 57-78 (2000).  
 32. See PRC Labor Law, supra note 8.  
 33. There has been labor legislation at all levels. At the top, the NPC enacted the Labor Code, 
but then there have also been Implementation provisions issued by other branches of government. For 
example, there have been regulations issued by the Supreme People’s Procuracy. Zuigao renmin 
jianchayuan guanyu renzhen zhixing “laodongfa” de tongzhi [Notice on the Serious Implementation 
of the Labor Law], available at http://www.lawbook.com.cn. Finally, the local People’s Congresses 
and Governments have issued regulations as well. See, e.g., Qingdao shi laodong zhengyi chuli tiaoli 
[Qingdao Municipality, Regulations for the Resolution of Labor Disputes]. The Qingdao regulations 
were enacted by the People’s Congress of Qingdao. Id. prmbl. 
 34. JOSEPHS, supra note 7, at 60-100; LAODONG FA SHILI SHUO [SPEAKING ABOUT THE LABOR 
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C. China Joins the World: International Influence on China’s Labor Law 
Reforms 
Coupled with domestic support for legal reform is the influence of 
many of the international organizations that China has joined or will join. 
Indeed, China has become a much more proactive member of the 
international community since the beginning of the Deng-era in the late 
1980s.35 Certainly, China’s impending entry into the WTO has had an 
extraordinary influence over the legislation promulgated in the last ten 
years.36 With regard to labor, the influence of the international 
community,37 particularly the International Labor Organization (ILO), is 
quite apparent in the 1994 Labor Law.38 However, as previously 
mentioned, the problem is not the amount of legislation, or, for the most 
part, its substantive content, but rather the effective enforcement of these 
new laws and regulations.  
 
 
LAW AND ITS PRACTICAL USE] 100 (Qi Wei Ping ed. 1999).  
 35. See generally CHINA JOINS THE WORLD: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS (Elizabeth Economy & 
Michael Oksenberg eds., 1999).  
 36. ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIAN [LEGAL YEARBOOK OF CHINA] 17-20 (2001). 
 37. China has ratified “pizhun” twenty-two international treaties regarding labor, including: the 
Chemical Products Treaty, the Employment Policy Treaty, the Minimum Employment Age Treaty, 
The Labor Administration and Management Treaty, and The Treaty on Safety Protection in the 
Construction Industry. A more comprehensive list of the treaties ratified and acknowledged by the 
PRC is available at the website of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security at 
http://www.molss.com.cn. See also LIU WEN HUA, WTO YU ZHONGGUO LAODONG FALU ZHIDU DE 
CHONGTU YU GUIBIAN [THE CONFLICTS AND SIMILARITIES OF CHINA’S LABOR LAW SYSTEM AND 
THE WTO’S] 108-14 (2001) [hereinafter WTO AND CHINA LABOR].  
 38. Scholars studying China’s entry into the WTO have done much work on the challenges that 
face things like Labor Law in the future. WTO AND CHINA LABOR supra note 37, at 118. One author 
claims that while China’s Labor Law and the policies of the ILO are “unified,” there still need to be 
further research done on harmonizing the two in order to bring China totally into compliance. Id. at 
146. A comparison of ILO policy expressed through recommendations and treaties and the general 
principles and rights afforded to the work under PRC law reveals that Chinese legislators did take the 
ILO and international policy on labor into account when drafting the Labor Code. Id. One author 
commented with regard to the long and sometimes tenuous relationship between China and the ILO: 
“Only in the mid-1990s did [China] begin to take its obligations more seriously and to invoke ILO 
standards as protection against labor unrest and foreign exploitation as it had in its pre-1949 history.” 
ANN KENT, CHINA, UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 123-24 (1999). In addition to China’s 
somewhat tense history with the United Nations, some might also argue that perhaps the itself has a 
rather uneasy relationship with the ILO. Hillary K. Josephs, Upstairs Trade Law Downstairs Labor 
Law, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 849 (2001). Professor Josephs argues that labor standards as set forth by 
the International Labor Organization have become almost incompatible with the evolving WTO 
framework and in the context of current international trade and business practices. Id. It is this divorce 
between economics and labor standards that has caused much of the problems in China. China is a 
source of cheap labor for foreign manufacturers. Much of this foreign investment drives China’s 
economic reforms and the new wealth that has taken hold, but in order for labor to remain cheap labor 
law enforcement has fallen from the agenda. See generally Hillary K. Josephs, Labor Law in a 
Socialist Market Economy: The Case of China, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 559 (1995).  
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II. LEGAL MECHANISMS FOR RESOLVING DISPUTES AND ENFORCING 
LABOR LAW 
A. The Civil Law and Dispute Resolution 
The PRC Labor Law provides for the settlement of disputes through 
one of three ways: mediation, arbitration (zhongcai),39 and litigation 
(susong).40 The last option of litigation, however, is only available after 
the parties to the labor dispute have gone through the arbitration process.41 
These methods of dispute resolution constitute a mechanism for the 
worker to seek redress for her grievances, such as contract disputes, 
through the civil law. One scholar comments that China’s 1994 Labor Law 
seems to reflect warmer feelings on the part of the Chinese government 
with regard to civil liability in the context of labor and employment law.42 
The Labor Law does include quite a few civil remedies for workers 
seeking relief for various problems relating to wages and breach of 
contract.43 In actuality, however, little relief has been afforded to workers, 
who decide to use the civil law to solve their problems.44 Instead, a worker 
who sues may not only lose the suit, but may also lose her job or face 
retribution from her employer.45  
B. Administrative Penalties 
For the most part, the administrative penalties that may be imposed on 
the employing unit for Labor Law violations are fines exacted by the local 
branch of MOLSS.46 The Labor Law empowers the local people’s 
governments and the local branches of the MOLSS to inspect and 
prosecute all violations of the Labor Law.47 However, the fines may be 
 
 
 39. Article 79 of the Labor Law specifically states: “If a party is not satisfied with the decision of 
the arbitration then it may litigate the dispute before the people’s courts PRC Labor Law, art. 81. The 
most likely reason for the non-binding nature of the arbitration decision is that the arbitration 
commission consists of members of the employing unit as well as members from the All China Labor 
Union at the corresponding level. Interview, July 18, 2002. The option to go to the courts is most 
likely available to get an impartial judge for the dispute.  
 40. PRC Labor Law, ch. 10  
 41. Id. art. 79.  
 42. Josephs, Upstairs Trade Law, supra note 38, at 568.  
 43. PRC Labor Law, ch. 12. 
 44. 2002 CECC REPORT, supra note 11, at 84-120.  
 45. Id.  
 46. PRC Labor Law, ch. 12.  
 47. Id. ch. 11. The Labor Law allows for inspection of facilities for safety regulations. Id. The 
Labor Department is responsible for conducting these inspections and obstruction of the Labor 
Department in this charge can result in criminal penalties for the inspectee. Id. Article 88 of the Labor 
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little more than a slap on the wrist for already ambivalent employers, 
although technically more severe administrative penalties such as halting 
of operations (tingye) may be possible under certain circumstances.48 
These administrative penalties may be in addition to a civil suit brought by 
the worker.49 Thus, for some violations of the Labor Law, except for 
general safety violations, the party injured may seek compensation under 
the civil law, and MOLSS may also institute administrative penalties on 
the employing unit.50 
C. Criminal Penalties  
There are also remedies available under the criminal law for certain 
more serious violations of the Labor Law and relevant regulations.51 
Regardless of the provisions of the Labor Law that mention criminal 
liability, any criminal liability relating to the workplace or the worker is 
liability completely under the PRC Criminal Law and its provisions.52 In 
other words, the Labor Law does not itself criminalize behavior, the 
criminal law does.53 
 
 
Law allows for any individual or organization to report or expose labor violations to the Department of 
Labor in the area. Id. art. 88. Of course, a worker, fearing termination, may be hesitant to report such a 
violation to the authorities. 
 48. PCR Labor Law, ch. 12.  
 49. Id. ch. 12.  
 50. The Labor Law specifies the situations in which compensation may be sought. Id. ch. 12. 
This includes violation of contracts causing loss to the employees and infringements of the Labor Law 
which result in harm to minors or female staff workers. Id. arts. 95, 97. However, the Labor Law does 
not exclude the possibility of workers seeking compensation under other laws. Id. art. 105. For an 
example of how a case can result in civil and administrative penalties for the employing unit, see The 
Administrative Case of a Certain Brick Maker Using Child Labor, in LAODONGFA LIJIE SHIYONG YU 
AANLI PINGXI [A PRACTICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE LABOR LAW AND CASE ANALYSIS] 200 (Gao 
Yan & Li Jun eds., 1996) [hereinafter LABOR LAW AND UNDERSTANDING CASES] (describing how a 
mine which had employed a 16 year old boy was subject to administrative penalties, but avoided 
potential civil penalties on behalf of the boy by his mother by agreeing to compensate the boy for his 
medical expenses). The distinction between administrative and civil law in labor cases reflects the 
hybrid nature of labor law common to many civil law nations. THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE, 
EAST ASIA & LATIN AMERICA CASES AND MATERIALS 1144 (John Merryman et al. eds., 1994).  
 51. See PRC Labor Law, ch. 12. 
 52. LABOR LAW UNDERSTANDING AND CASES, supra note 50, at 305. 
 53. One author comments with regard to criminal liability for labor practices: “What we must 
pay attention to is that criminal matters within the scope of the Labor Law can not be used 
independently, rather it is necessary to unite the labor code with the provisions in the Criminal Code.” 
Id. at 305. Indeed, there is a strong separation between civil, criminal, and administrative law as there 
is in most legal systems. For a better explanation of this separation See Merryman, supra note 50, at 
1144. The major difference between civil and criminal liability is that it is the state which is imposing 
it through the relevant criminal law personnel on the party responsible for the act. Id. This is an 
important point to remember in talking about enforcement of the law, that is that there are different 
mechanisms available for enforcing criminal law than administrative and civil law.  
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There are several provisions in the Criminal Law, which correspond or 
match directly with similar provisions in the chapter entitled “Legal 
Liability” in the Labor Law.54 Indeed, criminal liability may be imposed in 
the following areas: safety protection, prohibition of child labor, protection 
of the personal and democratic rights of the laborers (forced labor), and 
maintaining an adequate inspection system.55 There is one final 
requirement for intersections between the Labor Law and the Criminal 
Law to arise: the circumstances must be especially severe (qingjie 
yanzhong).56  
The tools that one needs to analyze how the criminal law can be used to 
punish labor safety violations are simply to understand the general 
provisions of the criminal law on dolus specialis (mens rea), the concept of 
criminal liability for a corporation or other legal entity, and the actus reus 
for the specific crimes.57 Beginning with the actus reus of labor-related 
crimes, Articles 134-137 cover labor related accidents under the heading 
of “Crimes that Infringe on the Public Safety.”58 The mens rea for most of 
 
 
 54. See, e.g., PRC Criminal Law, arts 134-37, 244. 
 55. LABOR LAW UNDERSTANDING AND CASES, supra note 50, at 305.  
 56. Id. Indeed the severity requirement is one common to the distinction between criminal and 
civil liability in the United States as well. The negligence required for criminal liability in the United 
States must be gross negligence or for recklessness, very gross or very severe. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
CRIMINAL LAW 224-28 (3d ed. 2000). The criminal code of China also requires the accidents must be 
severe. PRC Criminal Law, arts. 134-37, 244.  
 57. The Chinese Criminal Law is based on the German model with a general part and a specific 
part. Donald C. Clarke & James V. Feinerman, Criminal Law and Human Rights in China, in CHINA’S 
LEGAL REFORMS 135, 137 (Stanley Lubman ed. 1996).  
 58. Article 134 of the Criminal Law relates to the liability for staff members of a factory, mine, 
forestry center, construction enterprise or other enterprise or institution who causes an accident when 
he acts contrary to regulations. PRC Criminal Law, art. 134 (Wei Luo trans. 1998). Article 135 relates 
to the a factory, mine, forestry center, construction enterprise or other enterprise which fails to meet 
safety standards and thereby causes a serious accident. Id. art. 135. Article 136 relates to a person who 
“violates the regulations for controlling explosive, combustible, radioactive, poisonous or corrosive 
materials” and causes a serious accident. Id. art. 136. Article 137 relates to a “builder, designer, 
contractor or . . . engineer” who violates safety standards and causes an accident. Id. art. 137. 
Particular attention should be paid to Article 135 and its text, which is as follows:  
 Where a factory, mine, forestry center, construction enterprise, or other enterprise or 
institution which has work safety facilities failing to meet standards set by the state and does 
not take measures to remove hidden perils that were pointed out by relevant departments or 
its employees, thereby causing a serious accident involving injury or death and serious 
consequences, personnel who are directly responsible shall be sentences to fixed-term 
imprisonment . . .  
Id. (Wei Luo trans.) [emphasis added].  
 Attention should also be paid to Article 244, which deals with forced labor that violates a 
laborer’s rights. PRC Criminal Law, art. 244. This Article is referenced in Article 96 of the Labor Law 
which states in relevant portion “Where the employing unit commits one of the following acts . . . 
persons who are held directly responsible shall be investigated for criminal responsibility according to 
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these crimes is assumedly negligence, and the accident caused must be 
“severe” (zhongda.)59 While the personnel directly responsible for the 
actus reus may be punished with either imprisonment or a fine.60  
What emerges from these provisions as cited above is that when a 
safety accident (1) occurs, (2) results in death, injury, or severe 
consequences, (3) is due to violations that had already been pointed out by 
the authorities or the employees of the corporation, and (4) is severe, then 
criminal liability shall attach for those personnel who are directly (zhijie) 
responsible for its occurrence.61 The provisions do not specifically 
mention punishing the enterprise itself through a fine or by halting its 
operations.62 The punishment for personnel under the circumstances in 
Articles 134-37 is up to three years in prison, and under particularly severe 
 
 
law: . . . Compelling laborers to work by means of violence, intimidation or illegal restriction of 
personal freedom.” PRC Labor Law art. 96.  
 59. PRC Criminal Law, arts. 14-15. The Criminal Law sets out two types of mens rea: intentional 
and negligent. Id. Article 15 states:  
A negligent crime refers to a crime committed by a person who should have foreseen that his 
act would possible produce socially dangerous consequences but who fails to do so because 
of carelessness or, having foreseen the consequences, readily believes that they can be 
avoided, the result being that these consequences do occur. 
PRC Criminal Law, art. 15 (Wei Luo trans. 1998). Article 16 of the Criminal Code states that if the 
consequences were “unforeseeable or unavoidable” there is no criminal responsibility. Id. The 
provisions above clearly mean, to translate this into American law terms, that a mental state of actual 
or imputed knowledge is necessary for the crime of negligence.  
 60. Id. arts. 30-31. Article 31 states:  
A unit shall be fined in the case of committing a crime, and the responsible persons in charge 
or those directly at fault shall be punished. Where there are other stipulations in the Special 
Provisions of this Law or other laws, those stipulations shall prevail. 
Id. art. 31. The corporate fiction is covered by Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo minfa tongze [General 
Principles of Civil Law in the People’s Republic of China] in XINBIAN, at 227. Under these principles 
there are no provisions that make it difficult for prosecutors to pierce the corporate veil and hold 
managers liable for the sins of the corporation. See id. In addition the Supreme People’s Court has 
ruled on this issue as well, holding that those entities which may be held liable for criminal liability are 
State-Owned Enterprises, Communal Enterprises, Enterprises, Commercial Enterprises, Joint 
Ventures, Cooperative Ventures, Wholly Owned Foreign Enterprises, and Domestic Privately Owned 
Enterprises. Zui gao renmin fa yuan: guanyu shenli danwei fanzui anjian juti yingyong de falu [The 
Supreme People’s Court on Related Questions on to the Appropriate Law for Adjudicating Cases in 
Which a Corporation Has Committed a Crime]. This leaves us with the idea that Chinese courts have 
indeed had no problem with holding corporate entities (faren) liable criminally for violations of labor 
safety standards, but another question emerges as to whether holding those directly responsible is 
indeed an appropriate way of holding the corporation responsible. Does holding a manager or someone 
who merely oversees the operation of the plant really mean that we are holding the corporation 
responsible? Perhaps the manager is an easy scapegoat. There may be some distinct problems with 
following liability for the corporation and those who actually control it in the Chinese case, especially 
when we are referring to the paradigm set forth by state enterprises.  
 61. PRC Criminal Law, arts. 134-37.  
 62. Id.  
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circumstances, three to seven years in prison.63 In order to fully analyze 
this situation under the Criminal Law and make a proposal as to how it 
should be amended or reinterpreted, it will be necessary to consider each 
one of these elements separately and then in combination with one 
another. This methodology will parse out the strengths and weaknesses in 
the law.  
III. THE SPECIFICS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS FOR LABOR SAFETY 
VIOLATIONS 
A. The Accident Must Have Already Occurred 
The effect of requiring that the accident must occur and must involve 
some sort of death, injury, or other severe result is that it precludes 
liability for reckless endangerment of workers or pre-accident 
cirmcumstances that create a very high degree of risk.64 Also, if the 
accident only involves a small or unserious consequence, then, absent 
some sort of minor criminal sanction (such as a fine), the law may proffer 
no incentive for a corporation to fix the problem and thereby avoid a larger 
or more serious accident in the future.  
B. The Accident Must be Due to Violations Already Pointed Out 
This element clearly shows that there must be actual knowledge of the 
safety violation on the part of those in charge and therefore rules out 
imputed knowledge. Without the possibility of prosecution for imputed 
knowledge, managers and personnel will have little incentive to inspect 
facilities and unearth latent hazards, except in the case where there are 
direct orders from the local MOLSS branch. The employees themselves 
may not have the technical skills necessary to spot a problem and avoid 
accidents. In addition, MOLSS inspection teams may be short handed and 
real inspections may not be conducted with regularity.65 Thus, this 
requirement that the violation already be pointed out inhibits prosecution 
 
 
 63. Id.  
 64. This kind of a legal provision is not unheard of in the United States. The California Penal 
Code § 387 covers “Corporate Liability for nondisclosure of serious concealed danger subject to 
regulatory authority.” CAL. PEN. CODE § 387 (Deering 2002). The provision makes punishable failure 
to disclose such violations before an accident actually occurs. This is a way of avoiding a serious 
problem and providing an inventive for managers to seek out and fix problems. Id.  
 65. Interview, July 8, 2002 (text on file with author).  
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and provides no incentive for managers to conduct regular inspections and 
refrain from negligent behavior.  
C. The Personnel Directly Responsible Will Assume Criminal Liability 
The largest problem with this phrase is that it is vague and undefined. 
The primary issue is whether the law holds the corporation, and thus the 
personnel responsible, or merely holds the personnel actually directly 
responsible liable for the damages caused. This debate is prominent in 
Chinese legal circles, and some scholars have argued vigorously that it 
should be the corporation and thus the personnel that are held 
responsible.66 If it is the corporation that is primarily responsible, then this 
distinction may open the door for liability higher up the management 
chain.67 The major question then becomes: how high up in the chain does 
the procurator need to go in order to ensure that the personnel with real 
power correct safety violations. Obviously, there is no one right answer, 
however there must be a balance between the power to correct the 
violation and the opportunity and duty of oversight of the workspace. This 
issue will become more salient when discussing possible amendments to 
the law. 
D. Prosecuting Under a Theory of Murder  
If there is an accident that causes the deaths of employees, then why 
can it not be prosecuted under a theory of negligent homicide? It should be 
noted here that negligent and intentional murder are certainly theories that 
could be used under the Chinese Criminal Law.68 If the purpose of 
connecting criminal law and the labor law is to protect against death or 
 
 
 66. LONG BEI HAU & XIAO ZHONG HUA, XINGFA YINAN ZHENGYI WENTI YU SIFA DUICE 
[PROBLEMS AND DISPUTES OVER THE CRIMINAL LAW AND JUDICIAL POLICY] 264-67 (2001), 
[hereinafter CRIMINAL LAW & PROBLEMS]. The question here is what is the “subject” or “zhuti” of the 
crime. The authors of CRIMINAL LAW & PROBLEMS point out that because what we are talking about 
with regard to provision 135 of the PRC Criminal Law is essentially a negligent crime that we should 
hold the corporation and thus the personnel responsible for it. However, were it to be an intentional 
crime, then the corporation, clearly a legal fiction, would be an entity incapable of perpetrating such an 
offense. Id. at 264. With regard to the personnel directly responsible, the authors also point out that, 
based on other legal provisions, there are two possibilities of who should be held responsible: the 
managers and the workers, or just the workers. Id. at 265. The Authors believe that it should be just the 
workers. Id. at 265-66. This Note will take a different position arguing that both the managers and the 
workers should be held responsible. Indeed under some conditions it should be just the managers, and 
the high-up managers at that, who should be held responsible for such accidents.  
 67. Id. 
 68. PRC Criminal Law, ch. 4 (“Crimes Against the Person”).  
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injury then should there not be a reference in the Labor Law that points the 
procurator towards the provisions in the Criminal Law that deal with 
murder? This important question is one which will be addressed in the 
following sections.  
IV. ENFORCEMENT ISSUES 
It is quite obvious that despite the legal regime in place for enforcing 
the safety provisions in the Labor Law and in the newly enacted Safe 
Production Law, there are still a great deal of safety violations.69 This Note 
shall begin to answer the question of how a more streamlined mechanism 
of criminal enforcement might just solve the problem.  
A. The Enforcement Apparatus  
Any evaluation of how to create an effective deterrent to the problem 
of enforcing labor safety standards will necessarily involve some 
comparison between the administrative and criminal law provisions for the 
enforcement of the law and the punishment of offenders. First, it is clear to 
some extent that administrative sanctions have not solved the problem 
because significant safety violations and large accidents continue in large 
numbers. Although administrative penalties have become much more 
severe, this part will show why the criminal justice is arguably better 
suited for the task of bringing down the number of labor safety 
violations.70 
As previously mentioned, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security is 
the administrative or bureaucratic agency responsible for inspecting 
facilities investigation whether the operation is in compliance with 
 
 
 69. A tragic fire killed 87 people at the Zhili Toy Factory in Southern China. Robert Senser, 
Toying with Lives, AMERICAN EDUCATOR, Jan. 1, 2002, at 36. The factory was not in compliance with 
Shenzhen’s fire safety regulations and mangers had ignored the repeated warnings of a city inspection 
team. Id. A year later a dormitory collapsed at another toy factory killing eleven people. Id.  
 70. Two laws illustrate this nicely: The Law on the Promotion of Small and Medium Sized 
Enterprises and the Safety Protection Law. The SMSE law is quite obviously aimed at pushing Small 
and Medium Sized Enterprises, which constitute ninety-nine percent of China’s total number of 
enterprises towards structural reform. Interview, July 27, 2002 (text on file with author). Still despite 
the fact that these laws represent concrete steps on the part of the Chinese government to get at the real 
problems facing the workers in the cities and suburban areas, the problem of enforcement is still the 
biggest issue. As was pointed out before, the Chinese Communist Party no longer maintains the same 
kind of tight reins on its cadres that it did during the Mao era. Lieberthal, supra note 27. Recently there 
has been much of scholarly attention given to the problem of corruption in China. The Deng reforms 
have given the local cadres even more room to move and thus, to break with central policies in favor 
of their own interests. See generally LU XIAO BO, CADRES & CORRUPTION (2000).  
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relevant safety standards.71 It is generally considered to be a small and 
ineffective ministry. Criminal enforcement, however, is carried out by the 
Public Security Agency (Gonganju), and criminal prosecutions are carried 
out by the local procuratorate.72 The chain of command then for 
prosecuting labor safety violations or accidents, which warrant criminal 
penalties under the current system, is that violators are detained by the 
public security apparatus and investigated by the procuratorates in a 
specific locality.73 Once the procurators’s investigation uncovers a 
violation, the prosecution is mandatory according to China’s Criminal 
Law.74  
B. The Advantages to Using the Criminal Justice System  
The most obvious difference between criminal and administrative 
enforcement is the severity of the penalty that is involved.75 Under 
 
 
 71. PRC Labor Law, supra note 8, at Chapter 12.  
 72. The responsibilities of the various law enforcement agencies can be found in the following 
laws: Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo jingcha fa [The Police Law of the People’s Republic of China], in 
XINBIAN; Zhang gonghua renmin gonghe guo zhian fa [The Public Security Law of the People’s 
Republic of China], in XINBIAN. The organization and function of the People’s Procuracy is laid out in 
Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo jiancha fa [The Procuracy Law of the People’s Republic of China], in 
XINBIAN; Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo jiancha yuan zuzhi fa [The Organization Law of the People’s 
Procuracy], in XINBIAN. For further discussion of these organs of the Chinese State, see WANG 
CHENGUANG & ZHANG XIANCHU, supra note 18, at 62-64. Some of the more relevant responsibilities 
include: investigating criminal cases, reviewing cases that other public security organs of the state 
have investigated, and “to initiate public prosecutions of criminal cases and support such 
prosecutions.” Id. at 62.  
 73. See PRC Labor Law, supra note 8, at Chapter 5.  
 74. Article Three of the PRC Criminal Law states “Any act deemed by explicit stipulations of 
law as a crime shall be convicted and given punishment by law and any act that no explicit stipulations 
of law deem a crime shall not be convicted or given punishment.” PRC Criminal Law, art. 3 (Wei Luo 
trans. 1998). Thus if the procurator finds after her investigation that the conduct in question is criminal 
then, according to the Criminal Law, the procurator must prosecute that act. This provision is further 
defined by the following passage from a commentator on the criminal law:  
Article 3 of the criminal code states that “what the law formally deems criminal behavior 
shall be tried and punished according to the law. But, what the law does not formally deem 
criminal behavior must not be tried and punished.” But what does this so-called “principle of 
the criminal law” deem as crimes, and what are the different criteria for each crime? 
Whatever they may be, we must follow the law, and what the law does not deem a crime we 
cannot punish someone for . . . . What is wrong does not necessarily violate the law, what is a 
violation of the law is not necessarily a crime, but what is a criminal wrong must be dealt 
with according to the law. Nevertheless, we must be careful not to talk about all of these 
situations as if they are the same. 
Song Bo, Lawyers Defending Each Other, in ZHONGGUO LUSHI [CHINA LAWYER], Apr. 9, 1999, at 33.  
 75. The penalties for some labor-related crimes in the PRC can range anywhere from three to 
seven years. PRC Criminal Law, arts. 134-37. Once there has been a criminal investigation there must 
be a prosecution and if the defendant is found guilty then the punishment must be prison. Id. art. 134. 
It should also be noted, however, that China’s Criminal Procedure Law does have the principle of 
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administrative law, the possibility of prison is not ruled out, but the length 
of the incarceration and the size of the fine will most certainly be less. The 
Criminal Law has more teeth one might say because threatening 
someone’s freedom or life (if the accused is sentenced to death) surely has 
a greater deterrent effect on their conduct than does threatening their 
money.76 Criminal sanctions also have other serious advantages to 
deterring enterprises. First, a criminal indictment may have a shaming 
function and is bad publicity, especially in the case of a foreign enterprise, 
for which the foreign media can play a very important role.77 Second, 
criminal prosecutions involve the State and the individual. This will allow 
the Chinese State to play an active role in the punishment through a 
centralized system of procuratorates.78 With criminal prosecutions there is 
not the same threat to the State’s power that there would be from the 
individual pursuing a civil action on his or her own.79 Finally, China’s 
criminal law system is generally feared by the citizenry.80  
 
 
innocent until proven guilty or (“bu de fui ding wuzui”). Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo xingshi susong 
fa [Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China], art. 4, in XINBIAN.  
 76. See supra note 56.  
 77. Indeed, there is no liability for a foreign corporation that participates in a type of processing 
arrangement (san lai yi bu). In each of the three types of processing arrangements the firm provides 
something to a Chinese manufacturer and the manufacturer returns a finished product. In these 
arrangements the foreign firm remains relatively disconnected from the labor. Although the 
arrangement is not often used, it is still one avenue for foreign firms to escape liability. See Guanyu 
jiaqiang sanlai yibu guanli de ruogan guiding [Several Regulations on Improving the Management of 
Processing Arrangements], http://www.law-lib.com.cn. If these manufacturers were subject to criminal 
indictments there is a good chance that the response from the media would be even more potent. 
Perhaps then foreign manufacturers would be more careful about choosing their partners in a 
processing arrangement.  
 78. PRC CONSTITUTION, ch. 3, § 4.  
 79. In traditional Chinese Law there was not such a concept of due process. Criminal liability 
was imposed as a means of punishment and the presumption was one of guilt. See SOURCES OF 
CHINESE TRADITION, VOL. 1 90-100 (William Theodore Debarry et al. eds., 1958) (stating that one of 
the major modes of thought behind early Chinese criminal law was exclusively to punish because it 
was assumed that anyone accused was a bad person whose character needed correction). See also 
HUANG REN YU, WANLI SHIWU NIAN [FIFTEEN YEARS OF THE EMPEROR WAN LI] 23-28 (1999) 
(painting a picture of typical Ming Dynasty justice in which the accused was brought before the 
emperor and simply sentenced without any chance to plead his or her case). See also HSUN TZU 
[WRITINGS OF HSUN TZU (XUN ZI)] 44-55 (2d ed. 1996) (laying out the dominant theories behind the 
legalist school of thought, which focused on punishment without much thought to a process of 
determining the guilt or innocence of the accused). 
 80. During the beginning of the Deng years and even into the 1980s China’s government 
conducted movement-style crack downs on crime called the Stern-blows movement or rather the 
yanda yundong. These campaigns have left many of China’s citizens with a bad taste in their mouths, 
because cadres were under pressure to arrest people which forced unsound convictions. One author 
writes: “Local police frequently brought in crime suspects with little or no evidence, insisting that 
local procurators prosecute and the courts convict. Years later, official court histories were deeply self-
critical about the ease with which they had surrendered to this pressure during the campaign’s first 
four months.” Murray Scot Tanner, State Coercion and the Balance of Awe: The 1983-86 Stern Blows 
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The conclusion that one might arrive at is that China’s criminal justice 
system is more capable of affectively dealing with the problem of labor 
safety violations. Of course, any proposed amendments to the Criminal 
Law or the Labor Law must comport with the kind of due process 
considerations that China is seeking to promote within its system.81 Indeed 
it is clear that many in the PRC are committed to establishing a solid 
criminal justice system.82 With this kind of a system in place and with the 
adequate protections and consideration for due process for those accused 
of crimes, the criminal law may very well go a long way towards 
correcting some of the problems that exist with labor safety violations. In 
fact, other countries83 have also examined the possibility of using the 
criminal law to punish severe labor safety violations that lead to death or 
serious injuries of workers.84  
The remainder of this Note is devoted to a proposal that China deal 
with labor safety violations using a theory of murder and institute (1) a 
 
 
Anti-Crime Campaign CHINA J., July 2000, 93, 125. Although such horrific campaigns have ceased, 
they are definitely an indication that the Chinese Government has shown that their criminal law system 
is to be taken seriously. Id.  
 81. The Chinese legislature revised its Criminal Procedure Law in 1996 calling for a drastic 
overhaul of the system. See PRC Criminal Procedure Law. Since the revisions the government has 
even conducted investigations into the progress of local cadres in enforcing some of the provisions. A 
report on the investigation and its progress states:  
At the 9th session of the standing committee of the 19th National People’s Congress, the head 
of the internal judicial committee Hou Zong Bin reported on the National People’s Congress 
standing committee’s examination of the enforcement of the Criminal Procedure Law of the 
People’s Republic of China. This examination of the enforcement of the law was arranged 
through the work of the 2000 standing committee, which in September of 2000 created six 
small groups which proceeded to six places, including Tianjin municipality, the autonomous 
region of Inner Mongolia, Heilongjiang province, Zhejiang province, Hubei province and 
Xiaxi province to evaluate how the 1996 amended criminal procedure law had taken effect. 
At the same time the standing committee of the N.P.C. entrusted the task of investigating the 
effects of the new law to the local governments of six other places, including Hebei province, 
Jilin province, Shandong province, Guangxi province, Yunnan province, and Qinghai 
province. 
Song Bo, Evaluating the Execution of the Law, CHINA LAWYER Apr. 1, 2000. One author even 
commented on the proposals coming out of the think-tank for the public security apparatus in the PRC: 
“recommendations [of the Number Four Institute of the Public Security Sector] . . . are actually more 
reformist than the content of China’s recently revised Criminal Procedure Law.” Murray Scot Tanner, 
Changing Windows on a Changing China: The Evolving “Think Tank” System and the Public Security 
Sector, 171 CHINA Q. 560, 570 (2002).  
 82. Id. at 570.  
 83. For an excellent analysis of the legal reforms which were greatly accelerated throughout the 
Deng-era and into the late 1980s, see SHAO-CHUAN LENG & HUNGDAH CHIU, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN 
POST-MAO CHINA 19 (1995). The reforms culminated with the new criminal procedure code in 1996. 
Supra note 81.  
 84. Other scholars have determined that prosecution of executives for serious labor accidents is 
an appropriate use of the criminal law. Kathleen F. Brickey, Death in the Workplace, 2 NOTRE DAME 
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 4, 753 (1987).  
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more specific mens rea requirement for the offenses in question, (2) a 
defined set of criteria and theory that allows for ease of prosecution and 
investigation, and (3) reckless endangerment liability for serious violations 
of safety standards set out in both the Labor Law and the Labor Safety 
Law.  
V. PROPOSAL FOR A NEW MODEL OF ENFORCING LABOR SAFETY LAWS 
AND REGULATIONS 
A. Negligent Homicide 
1. Mens rea 
According to the PRC Criminal Law, there are only two mental states 
that may apply to crimes therein: negligent and intentional.85 However, 
scholars have argued in favor of limiting the scope of negligent crimes 
within the Criminal Law, which may create a problem for this analysis 
because the provisions on safety accidents within the code do not make 
specific mention of negligence.86 Thus, in order to apply the provisions in 
the Criminal Law dealing specifically with safety accidents there might 
need to be amendments that allow for such crimes to be prosecuted under 
a theory of negligence.87 If, however, prosecution were to proceed under a 
 
 
 85. PRC Criminal Law, arts. 14-16.  
 86. PRC Criminal Law, arts. 15, 134-37. This becomes a problem when talking about the 
liability for managers for allowing a safety violation which eventually caused an accident to go on 
without remedy. Brickey, supra note 84, at 754-55 (stating that because there are not often incidents in 
which a corporate officer intentionally hurts those working for her, corporate criminal liability is 
predicated on neglect and the duty owed to the workers). Professor Brickey also notes, however, that it 
is not always clear whether the liability is premised on an affirmative act of the corporate officer 
(placing a harmful chemical in the way of workers without proper protection) or an omission (failing 
to provide protections or failure to remove the harmful chemical). Id. at 755 n.5. For the purposes of 
this discussion it would seem that under the requirements for mens rea for negligence of the Chinese 
Criminal Law, the liability can be premised on acting in a reckless manner or failing to act and 
therefore negligently breaching a duty. PRC Criminal Law, arts. 14-16. All that Chinese criminal law 
requires is that the actor in question disregard foreseeable consequences, and the provisions do not 
even make mention of a high degree of risk. PRC Criminal Law, art. 15. Admittedly, Chinese Criminal 
Law does not seem to be as sensitive to the act/omission distinction as does American criminal law. 
LAFAVE, supra note 56, at 250.  
 87. This analysis excludes two possibilities. First, although the Criminal Law makes no mention 
of what western criminal law terms strict liability or malum in prohibitum crimes, a judge might 
determine that the introductory language of provisions 134-137 does not call for any finding of a 
culpable mental state. PRC Criminal Law Articles 134-37 (stating that “any person” (“you ren”) who 
commits the acts set forth shall be guilty of a crime). Id. Criminal law provisions that call for strict 
liability often begin with this kind of “any person who does X” language and they omit an adverb or 
adverbial phrase describing a mental state (i.e. willfully, intentionally, negligently, recklessly). 
LAFAVE, supra note 56, at 400. Second, because the Criminal Law arts. 134-37 makes mention of an 
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theory of murder, a negligent mental state would be expressly permitted in 
the provisions of the Criminal Law.88 In the end, success may depend on 
the theory chosen, and the willingness of the procurator and judge to allow 
a negligence theory in a labor safety violation case.  
Furthermore, in dealing with criminal prosecution for labor safety 
violations the most appropriate option for mens rea is criminal negligence. 
Although intentional violations of the standards themselves might be 
possible, the harm was most likely caused by the negligence of the 
manager or corporate officer.89 Proceeding under a theory of negligent 
homicide, it will be necessary to determine the duty, the breach of that 
duty, and the causal connection between the act or the omission of the 
manager or corporate officer and the death or harm to the worker.90 
2. Duty  
In western criminal law, negligent homicide will be predicated on some 
type of duty whether it be statutory, contractual, or familial.91 The Chinese 
Criminal Law makes no mention in the negligence provisions of any sort 
of duty owed to the person harmed or injured.92 Although negligence itself 
is not predicated on a breach of duty within the Chinese Criminal Law, 
this does not mean that there is no duty to workers upon which a theory of 
negligent homicide might be advanced.93 The Labor Law expressly states 
that every worker has a right to a safe workplace.94 The duty of the 
employer to provide the employee with a safe work place is further 
 
 
“accident” (“shigu”), a judge might interpret the provision to imply that a theory of negligence might 
be appropriate.  
 88. Article 233 of the Criminal Law expressly permits prosecution on the grounds of negligent 
homicide. The punishment for negligently causing the death of another is 3 to 7 years unless otherwise 
dictated by provisions in the law. PRC Criminal Law, at art. 233. Article 235 of the Criminal Law 
allows for prosecution for negligently harming another person. Id. Articles 232 and 234 allow for 
prosecution for intentionally killing or harming another person respectively. Id.  
 89. Brickey, supra note 84, at 759.  
 90. See Clarke & Feinerman, supra note 57, at 137. The definition of negligence under the 1997 
Criminal Law in China represents a vast change from the 1979 code. XIN XINGFA XIUGAI DUIAN 
SHIYONG TUJIE [EXPLANATIONS AND USEFUL ANSWERS FOR THE AMENDED CRIMINAL LAW] 7 (Liu 
Jia Shen ed. 1997). Article 15 of the Criminal Law makes no explicit mention of an omission, but it 
does state that when a person behaves in such a way that they are disregarding foreseeable 
consequences then they should be guilty of a negligent crime. PRC Criminal Law, art. 15. This 
mention of “behavior” might be taken to mean that the person did not or do not affirmatively act. 
Thus, the omission might be part of or included in the definition of behavior; behavior is not defined in 
the Chinese Criminal Law. Id. ch. 1.  
 91. LAFAVE, supra note 56, at 292.  
 92. PRC Criminal Law, arts. 15, 233, 235.  
 93. Id.  
 94. PRC Labor Law, art. 3.  
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reinforced by the recently promulgated Safe Production Law.95 Both the 
Labor Law and the Safe Production Law include provisions which state 
that if violations of the laws constitute a crime, then criminal liability will 
be imposed.96 It seems possible then, if not entirely logical, that a 
procurator could premise a prosecution for negligent homicide under 
Article 233 of the Criminal Law on the duty that the employer or 
employing unit owes to the worker to provide a safe work place under the 
Labor Law97 and the Safe Production Law. Because both of these laws are 
national laws they are controlling under all circumstances pertaining to 
laborers in the PRC.98  
3. Breach  
In order for criminal prosecution to take place under most 
circumstances there needs to be harm caused, as the Criminal Code makes 
very little allowance for what American scholars would term inchoate 
crimes like attempt.99 For a prosecution under a murder theory or injury to 
the person theory, a worker must be actually harmed through the negligent 
or intentional behavior of the employer.100 Also, for prosecutions under 
provisions in the Crimes Against the Public Safety section of the Criminal 
Law there must be a large “zhongda” accident and the consequences must 
be severe or “yanzhong.”101 These provisions beg the question often asked 
about Chinese Law: to what extent exactly? Other laws are much more 
exact in the approach taken to what constitutes a large accident, but the 
criminal law makes nothing particularly quantifiable.102 In this analysis 
 
 
 95. Id. art. 92; Senser, supra note 68, at 37.  
 96. PRC Labor Law, art. 69.  
 97. Id. art. 9.  
 98. See PRC Legislation Law, ch. 2 (stating that national law (falu) decided by the National 
People’s Congress or the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress is supreme to all 
regulations, or other provisions promulgated by lower organs or bodies within the Chinese 
government).  
 99. PRC Criminal Law, at art. 233.  
 100. Id. arts. 134-37, 233, 235.  
 101. Id. arts. 134-37. 
 102. In the case of medical accidents (yiliao shigu) where negligence is also used as a theory for 
liability, “severe” or “zhongda” is actually defined. Weishengbu guojiazhong yiyao guanli ju guanyu 
yinfa <<zhongda yiliao guoshi xingwei shigu baogao zhidu de guiding>> de tonzhi [The National 
Pharmaceutical Bureau: Notice on Regulations for the System of Reporting Severe Negligent Behavior 
and Medical Accidents], Aug. 20, 2002, http://www.law-lib.com.cn. The Notice states in relevant part 
“Severely negligent medical malpractice means that 3 or more patients have died or that 10 or more 
patients have suffered bodily harm.” Id. art. 4. Thus, the severity of the negligence is not determined 
by the amount of the harm done to the individual but by the amount of people harmed. This might be a 
situation analogous to the “severe” accidents called for under Articles 134-37 of the Criminal Law. 
PRC Criminal Law, arts. 134-37.  
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one must be satisfied with saying that it will be up to the procurator and 
ultimately the judge to determine what is severe or large enough to 
constitute a crime.  
The next part of the breach that must be proven is the causal nexus 
between the harm inflicted and the behavior of the employing unit and 
those who manage it. Under the Chinese Criminal Code, employing units 
can be legal persons for the sake of the provisions in the code.103 
Jurisprudence has shown and scholars have argued that the actions of the 
employees may be imputable to the employing unit,104 and that both may 
be held responsible for negligent and intentional crimes.105 There is, 
therefore, some precedent in the Chinese system for holding the managers 
liable for breaching a duty to provide the workers with a safe workplace 
and thereby causing harm. 
4. Punishment 
The final question to resolve is: which one of the corporate actors 
should be held responsible for breaching a duty under the Labor Law and 
thereby causing an accident and injuries or deaths of workers. Ideally, 
such provisions would provide an incentive to whomever in that particular 
enterprise truly has the power to correct the problems that could 
potentially lead to accidents by directing funds to the manager overseeing 
the workers or an inspection team. Designing a catchall provision of that 
nature or manipulating provisions within the pre-existing law to that end is 
surely not an easy task.  
 
 
 103. Id. ch. 2, § 4. Note that a debate has emerged amongst legal scholars concerning whether or 
not the legal entity or enterprise may be held liable for a negligent crime as well as an intentional 
crime. CRIMINAL LAW & PROBLEMS, supra note 66, at 74. The consensus with regard to whether or 
not a legal entity may be held liable for a negligent crime is “intentional crimes first, and negligent 
crimes second.” Id. at 74. This general trend of the courts being tentative about charging a corporation 
with a negligent crime is also reflected in American law See Brickey, supra note 84, at 759 (stating 
that Illinois criminal homicide statutes state that the crime must be committed by a person).  
 104. Corporate criminal liability in China was not originally included in the 1979 criminal code, 
but rather began with the promulgation of Customs Law in 1987. In those regulations a corporate 
entity including governmental organs and collectives may be charged with the crime of smuggling. 
Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo hai guan fa [The Customs Law of the People’s Republic of China], in 
XINBIAN. This kind of liability has become more important as the PRC develops a private sector 
within its socialist market economy and new corporate forms have developed. CRIMINAL LAW & 
PROBLEMS, supra note 66, at 66. Since the promulgation of the 1979 criminal code a host of joint 
ventures, cooperative ventures, wholly owned foreign enterprises, and partnership enterprises have 
emerged. See generally LARDY, CHINA’S UNFINISHED ECONOMIC REVOLUTION, supra note 24; 
NICHOLAS LARDY, INTEGRATING CHINA INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2002); HE QING LIAN, 
XIANDAIHUA DE XIANJING [THE TRAPS OF MODERNIZATION] (1988). In short, as more and more 
corporate actors have emerged the demand for corporate liability has become greater.  
 105. See CRIMINAL LAW & PROBLEMS, supra note 66, at 249. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p503 Balzano book pages.doc  2/11/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
524 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 3:503 
 
 
 
 
It is helpful, therefore, to begin with the purpose of criminal sanctions 
for labor safety violations. Clearly there are three: punishment, deterrence, 
and education.106 The Criminal Law states that when a corporate entity is 
the subject of a criminal prosecution that the personnel directly 
responsible and the personnel in charge for the incident will bear 
responsibility.107 This kind of a vague provision leaves room for 
interpretation. Because current corporate law maintains the division of 
labor typical to corporate law in most other countries, it would seem that 
going after corporate officers would be the way to get the results 
desired.108 This result is ideal, but getting that high up the food chain in a 
Chinese court will certainly be difficult. It would also seem, however, that 
punishing a manager who may or may not have any power to fix a 
violation that has been reported to her would be unfair, although possibly 
easier to sell to a judge. On the other hand, one might argue that both of 
these actors should most likely bear responsibility. If a corporate officer 
has the power to fix a problem and does not, then he must pay the price for 
causing the death of a worker or workers. If a manager has reported the 
violation and a corporate officer refuses to have the problem fixed, and the 
manager lets the workers continue to be exposed to a grave risk of injury, 
then that manager should also bear criminal responsibility. Even if the 
corporate officers refuse to correct the violation, the manager still has the 
option to report the violation to the labor authorities under the Labor Law, 
and, as a last resort, the manager might set an example by quitting. 
Perhaps unemployment is preferable to prison. In the end, not every case 
will be the same, and it will all also depend on what the actors knew. From 
a policy standpoint, such prosecutions should (1) deter future violations, 
(2) educate managers and corporate officers as to their responsibility under 
the law, and (3) punish guilty offenders. 
B. Reckless Endangerment  
The Chinese Criminal Code makes no allowances for prosecution 
under a theory of reckless endangerment.109 However, this provision is not 
 
 
 106. These are generally considered some of the main purposes of criminal law in the United 
States. LAFAVE, supra note 56, at 7-12. Certainly these are some of the purposes set forth in the 
“General Principles” section of the 1997 Criminal Law. PRC Criminal Law ch. 1.  
 107. Id. ch. 1. 
 108. See Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gongsi fa [Company Law of the People’s Republic of 
China] chs. 1-3, in XINBIAN.  
 109. For a description of theories of reckless endangerment, see LAFAVE, supra note 56, at 292. 
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unheard of under the criminal law in other countries.110 This kind of 
liability will most likely be un-welcomed by Chinese authorities, but 
criminal liability beyond administrative fines would certainly provide a 
stronger deterrent for corporate officers and managers to be stricter and 
more disciplined regarding inspections of the facilities. Any liability for 
mangers or officers in this context would have to be sought under an 
amendment to the Chinese Criminal Law.111  
C. The Cultural Variable and the Politics of Enforcement 
All the issues of enforcement of the law in the People’s Republic of 
China is beyond the scope of this Note. Nevertheless, some of the 
questions left unanswered above will be answered more clearly in the 
context of the institutional and cultural situation in China. This is not to 
say what is right and wrong, or even what would be desirable to everyone 
involved, rather it is a question of what will work.112  
Prevailing localism in the Deng-era has made local officials into 
entrepreneurs.113 Many of these officials may have connections to officials 
in the labor department or even in the procuracy.114 The above mentioned 
framework depends on the commitment of the government to correct the 
problem.115 Enforcement of the law must be voluntary, and can only be 
achieved through the zealous cooperation of a variety of actors within 
society.116 There are, however, several factors which make enforcement 
 
 
 110. See California Penal Code, § 387.  
 111. It is uncertain as to whether liability should consist of a criminal fine or actual jail time. The 
Chinese Criminal Law is very specific on the extent of punishment for each type of crime. See, e.g., 
PRC Criminal Law, arts. 134-37. Failure to comply with safety inspection rules will certainly result in 
a money penalty administered by the labor department. PRC Labor Law, ch. 12. Thus, it would seem 
that a suspended sentence or perhaps even a short jail term if the violations are extraordinarily serious 
would have more of an educational and deterrent effect for corporate officers and managers.  
 112. Given the dire straights of laborers in the PRC, others have suggested the use of law as a 
means for solving the more serious problems. Senser, supra note 69, at 39. If law, and not policy, is 
the answer then criminal law may be the most appropriate legal mechanism.  
 113. Local officials have become the heads of many of these factories that are the sites of these 
accidents. Senser, supra note 69, at 37-39. For trends of local corruption, see LU XIAO BO, supra note 
70.  
 114. Senser, supra note 69.  
 115. Scholars in China hope for the independence of the judicial system. WANG PIN, SIFA 
GONGZHENG HE DULI [JUDICIAL INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE] 88 (2001). For now the State, 
consisting of the party and the governmental institutions has total control and the judiciary remains just 
another arm of the bureaucracy. Id. DAVID SHAMBAUGH, THE CHINESE STATE ch. 3 (2000).  
 116. BASSIOUNI ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 471 (2000).  
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through the criminal law a more attractive option than either the 
administrative or civil law.  
First, the procuracy is larger than most of the departments within the 
Chinese bureaucracy.117 This is true as well with regard to the Public 
Security Apparatus.118 More procurators and more public security officials 
means that there is better potential for enforcement of the criminal law. 
Second, the criminal law has a long and sound place in the Chinese legal 
tradition.119 Those who harm the good of the whole must be punished, or 
so the story goes. Third, and finally, the criminal law is the State versus 
the individual or legal person. Enforcement through the criminal law 
allows for the Chinese government to play the leading role, instead of 
individual lawyers and workers seeking redress under the civil law.120 
Lawyers challenging the State are generally seen as subversive and 
meddlesome.121 An increase in criminal sanctions for labor safety 
violations may very well have the desired deterrent and educational 
effects.  
In summary, the strategy laid out above uses the law in existence in the 
People’s Republic of China to prosecute both managers and corporate 
officers for severe violations of the Labor Law under a theory of negligent 
homicide. Alternatively, the Chinese government may choose to prosecute 
under provisions in the specific part of the Criminal Law which deal with 
labor accidents under the heading of Crimes Against the Public Safety.122 
Reckless endangerment liability is not unheard of, but is only possible if 
the Criminal Law is amended to include such provisions. Regardless of the 
liability theory used, China’s workers are in dire need of assistance at this 
junction in the reform process. Using the Criminal Law would not only 
instill more confidence in China’s legal system for those domestic and 
foreign actors who see it as an unreliable institution,123 but it may very 
 
 
 117. See Zhai, Jianxiong Judicial Information of the People’s Republic of China: A Survey, 
available at http://www.llrx.com/features/chinajudicial.htm#Court%20System (last visited Dec. 19, 
2003) (noting the size of the procuracy in comparison to other parts of the judicial system). There are 
around thirteen offices of procuracy per province. Id.  
 118. See Tanner, supra note 81, at 570. 
 119. ZHONGGUO FALU SHI, supra note 22, at 5-10.  
 120. Lawyers using the civil law to defend the rights of workers has led to disaster in the past as 
two lawyers have already been imprisoned by provincial authorities. See 2002 CECC REPORT, supra 
note 11, at 87.  
 121. Id. at 87. Charles Chao Liu, Note, China’s Lawyer System: Dawning Upon the World 
Through A Tortuous Process, 23 WHITTIER L. REV. 1037, 1037 (2002).  
 122. PRC Criminal Law, arts. 134-37.  
 123. 2002 CECC REPORT, supra note 11, at 84-120.  
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well also strengthen the powers of the Chinese judiciary and procuracy in 
the eyes of other arms of the bureaucracy.  
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